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Abstract 
This paper critically appraises the arguments that have been offered for what can be called 
‘the expressive function of punishment’. According to this view, what distinguishes 
punishment from other kinds of non-punitive hard treatment is that punishment conveys a 
censorial/reprobative message about what the punished has done, and that this expressive 
function should therefore be accepted as part of the nature and definition of punishment. 
Against this view, this papers argues that the standard account of punishment, according to 
which punishment is a kind of hard treatment that is imposed on an alleged offender in 
response to her alleged wrongdoing, can already properly account for punishment and 
distinguish it from other kinds of hard treatment when it is properly clarified and understood. 
Thus there is no need to accept the expressive function of punishment in addition to the 
standard account when it comes to the nature and definition of punishment.  
 
1. Introduction 
 Ever since it was first advanced by Feinberg,1 many theorists and philosophers have 
now come to accept the “expressive function of punishment”.2 According to this now rather 
                                                          
* Orchid ID: 0000-0002-8955-2711. Email: y.a.lee@surrey.ac.uk. 
1 Joel Feinberg, “The Expressive Function of Punishment,” The Monist 49 (1965): 397-423 
2 E.g. David Boonin, The Problem of Punishment (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), 21-23; Antony Duff, Punishment, 
Communication, and Community (Oxford, New York: OUP, 2001), xiv-xv or more recently, “How not to Define 
Punishment,” Philosophy and Public Issues 5 (1) (2015): 25-41, 38-41; Bill Wringe, An Expressive Theory of 
Punishment (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 103. 
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widely held view about the nature and definition of punishment, what distinguishes 
punishment from other kinds of non-punitive hard treatment is that punishment conveys a 
censorial/reprobative message about what the punished has done. More importantly is the 
way in which this censorial/reprobative message is conveyed in punishment. Punishment 
does not simply convey this message in a way that is separate from and independent of the 
hard treatment – for example by the conviction that happens prior to the hard treatment. 
Rather, it is conveyed more specifically by the hard treatment in question. As Feinberg 
explains, “It would be more accurate in many cases to say that the unpleasant treatment itself 
expresses the condemnation, and that this expressive aspect of his incarceration is precisely 
the element by reason of which it is properly characterized as punishment and not mere 
penalty”; or more simply (and dramatically), “the very walls of his cell condemn him…”3 
The aim of this paper is to ask whether there are good reasons for accepting this 
expressive function as part of the nature and definition of punishment. Following the title of 
Feinberg’s paper, I shall simply refer to this view as ‘the expressive function of punishment’. 
Central to the arguments that have so far been offered for this view is that this expressive 
function is needed to properly account for punishment and distinguish it from other kinds of 
non-punitive hard treatment.4 However, I shall argue that we can also properly account for 
punishment and distinguish it from other kinds of hard treatment by attending more closely 
to the other defining features of punishment that are already captured in what I shall refer to 
as the ‘standard account’, according to which punishment is a kind of hard treatment that is 
                                                          
3 Feinberg (n 1) 402. 
4 See txt at nn. 10 & 11. 
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imposed on an alleged offender in response to her alleged wrongdoing.5 If that is true, then 
no good reasons have yet been given for the expressive function of punishment. 
It is also important to stress at the outset that I am not trying to deny that punishment 
can sometimes have an expressive function. As I shall explain later on, the hard treatments in 
punishment (or particular instances of them) can sometimes be used or so happen to be seen 
as conveying a censorial/reprobative message. What I am keen to deny is simply that this 
expressive function is a necessary, essential or defining feature of punishment. This is what I 
mean when I object to the expressive function of punishment. 
Nothing that I shall argue in this paper implies that communicative/expressive 
justificatory theories of punishment are mistaken and that punishment cannot be justified in 
virtue of it communicating or expressing certain kinds of censorial/reprobative messages 
about the wrongdoings that wrongdoers have committed.6 This paper is concerned with the 
expressive function in relation to what punishment is and not in relation to its justification 
Why does this matter? It matters because it is important in its own right to not confuse 
what is contingent with what is necessary, essential or definitive of punishment. Furthermore, 
the expressive function of punishment does have other important normative implications 
concerning the justification of punishment. Thus for example, as shown by Feinberg, Von 
Hirsch and Ashworth,7 if the expressive function of punishment is true, then this gives us a 
plausible argument for requiring proportionality in punishment that is independent from any 
                                                          
5 H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 2nd edn. (Oxford, New York: OUP, 2008), 4-5. By ‘wrongs’, I refer 
not only to ‘moral wrongs’ but also ‘legal wrongs’.  
6 For different versions of communicative/expressive justificatory theories, see e.g. Duff, Punishment, 
Communication, and Community (n 2), Wringe (n 2) and Christopher Bennett, The Apology Ritual (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2008). 
7 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Vol. 4: Harmless Wrongdoing (New York, Oxford: OUP, 
1988), 149-155; and Andrew Von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing (Oxford, New York: 
OUP, 2005), 134-137. 
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justificatory theories of punishment.8 However, if the expressive function of punishment is 
not true, then this argument will not necessarily hold for all punishments simply in virtue of 
them being punishments. Rather, it will contingently depend on whether the hard treatments 
in question are so happen to be used or seen as conveying a censorial/reprobative message. 
I shall leave it for another occasion to spell out in detail the implications if we reject the 
expressive function of punishment. What this paper aims to do is simply to make a modest 
contribution in favour of the antecedent. 
 
2. Arguments for the Expressive Function of Punishment 
As explained earlier, central to the arguments that have so far been offered for the 
expressive function of punishment is that this function is needed to properly account for 
punishment and distinguish it from other kinds of non-punitive hard treatment. In particular, 
they start with what I shall be referring to as the ‘standard account’ of the nature and 
definition of punishment, according to which punishment is a kind of hard treatment that is 
imposed on an alleged offender in response to her alleged wrongdoing. They then go on to 
argue how this standard account fails to properly account for punishment and distinguish it 
from other kinds of non-punitive hard treatment unless it also includes the expressive 
function of punishment.9  
                                                          
8 By ‘proportionality in punishment’, I am referring to the admittedly imprecise requirement that the relative 
severity of the hard treatment in punishments should correspond to the relative seriousness of the wrongs in 
question, and that they should neither be so severe nor so lenient such that they fail to accurately reflect the 
seriousness of the wrongs to which they are punishments for. For further discussion of this, see e.g. ibid 138-
148. 
9 There is another way in which the standard account, as I have portrayed here, is incomplete. It fails to 
distinguish between punishment from vigilantism and revenge, and that an ‘imposed by authority’ criterion 
should be added to the standard account (see e.g. Hart (n 5) 5). I shall put this alleged incompleteness to one 
side for the purposes of this paper. For further discussion of this criterion, see e.g. Boonin (n 2) 23-24 and 
Wringe (n 2) 32-33 & 101-102. 
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Thus in one of the most famous arguments for the expressive function of punishment, 
Feinberg argues that the standard account fails to distinguish punishment from what he refers 
to as mere “penalties”, which includes “parking tickets, offside penalties, sackings, flunkings, 
and disqualifications”.10 More recently, Boonin has also argued how the standard account 
fails to exclude from punishment the case in which a prospective gang member is subjected 
to hard treatment in response to committing wrongs as part of an initiation ceremony.11  
Feinberg and Boonin are too quick in accepting the alleged inadequacy of the standard 
account here. As I shall show in the rest of this paper, the standard account can indeed 
distinguish punishment from these other kinds of non-punitive hard treatment when it is 
properly clarified and understood. In particular, in response to Boonin, I shall argue that his 
argument trades on an ambiguity about what it means to respond to an alleged wrongdoing. 
In response to Feinberg, I shall argue how it is not obvious (to me at least) that all instances 
of what he refers to as ‘mere penalties’ are not and should not be considered as punishments. 
What then distinguishes those that are punishments and those that are not, I shall argue, is 
precisely the standard account when it is suitably understood and clarified. 
My argument against the expressive function of punishment therefore depends on 
having a good case for the standard account as I understand it. This is precisely what I shall 
provide in the rest of this paper. My discussion will be divided into three main parts. I shall 
begin by clarifying how the element of ‘hard treatment’ should be understood in the standard 
account. This forms the basis for my subsequent discussions. I shall then move on to what it 
means to respond to an alleged wrongdoing and Boonin’s alleged counterexample for the 
                                                          
10 Feinberg (n 1) 398. 
11 Boonin (n 2) 22-23. 
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standard account, before finally coming back to Feinberg’s mere penalties and other related 
examples. 
 
3. Hard Treatment in the Standard Account 
While it is widely accepted that hard treatment must be included in any adequate 
account of the nature and definition of punishment, there is some debate over what exactly 
it consists of. According to Hart, it “must involve pain or other consequences normally 
considered unpleasant”.12 I follow many others in contending that the hard treatment in 
punishment does not simply involve the mere harming of others. Rather, it involves 
intentionally harming others.13  In other words, the harms that constitute hard treatment in 
punishment are therefore intended harms, and not merely accidental or foreseeable harms. 
Following Boonin, I shall refer to this as the “Intending harm requirement”.14 
One argument that is frequently cited for this requirement is precisely the fact that 
‘intended harms’ helps to distinguish punishment from many other kinds of non-punitive hard 
treatment that also involve the harming of others. Take (non-punitive) compensations for 
example; it is at least foreseeable that those who are required to compensate will often be 
harmed by them. However, what is intended in such compensations is not the infliction of 
harm on those who also harm others, but to bring those who have been harmed by others 
back to the level where they were at before. This seems to be precisely that which 
                                                          
12 Hart (n 5) 4.  
13 E.g. Boonin (n 2) 12-17; and Nathan Hanna, “Say What? A Critique of Expressive Retributivism,” Law and 
Philosophy 27 (2008): 123-150, 124-128. 
14 Boonin (n 2) 15, but see n 58. I shall talk about how this requirement should be applied to institutional cases 
of punishment at the end of section 4. See txt at n 54 through to n 59.  
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distinguishes such (non-punitive) compensations from punishments.15 Similarly, there is also 
a difference, for example, between being charged a fee for, say getting married, and being 
charged a fine for, say committing polygamy. If ‘harm’ is simply understood as something that 
makes someone worse off in some way or another,16 then both fees and fines would count as 
harming the person who are subjected to them. What then seems to distinguish them from 
each other is the fact that while the harms of fees are simply foreseeable side-effects of 
requiring people to bear the administrative costs of (in the above example) getting married, 
the harms of fines are intended on those who are fined. The same can also be said between 
on the one hand cases where someone is imprisoned for committing a murder, and on the 
other hand cases where someone is locked up in a psychiatric hospital after having been 
found to be criminally insane or is quarantined after having been diagnosed of a highly 
contagious and deadly disease.17 
The case for the intending harm requirement does not simply rest on the need and its 
ability to distinguish between (non-punitive) compensations and punishments, fines from 
fees, and imprisonments from other kinds of confinements that are not properly nor 
paradigmatically considered to be punitive. Had the harms that constitute hard treatment in 
punishment been merely accidental or foreseeable, then we would (and indeed should) 
consider someone as having been punished even when, due to a (fortunate) twist of fate, she 
is not harmed by the punishment in question. This, however, seems false. If an offender is, 
for example, sentenced to be punished by hanging, we would not consider her as having been 
punished accordingly had the rope broke and she walked away from the ‘hanging’ unscathed. 
                                                          
15 Sometimes compensations can be punitive – think, for example, exemplary/punitive damages in torts. I think 
such punitive compensations should rightly be counted as punishments. 
16 Ibid 7. See also txt at n 18. 
17 Ibid 12 and Hanna (n 13) 126. 
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Rather, we would (and I think rightly) at most consider it merely as an attempt to punish her 
accordingly, but which turned out to be unsuccessful due to the offender’s luck. The most 
straightforward explanation for this is that the harm, i.e. death by hanging, is not merely an 
accidental or foreseeable part of the punishment in question. Rather, it is an intended part of 
it; and accordingly, it is an unsuccessful instance of punishment when this intended harm fails 
to realize in the case that I have just described. 
For the purposes of the intending harm requirement, I am using ‘harm’ very broadly 
here to refer to anything that makes one’s life worse off in one respect or another.18 This is 
intended to not only include what Hart refers to by ‘pain or other consequences normally 
considered unpleasant’, but also suffering. It also includes treatments that are considered to 
be ‘burdensome’.19  
One important thing to emphasize about my broad understanding of harm is that I do 
not think whether one is harmed or not depends solely on one’s subjective state of mind. 
Thus something can – in this sense ‘objectively’ - harm someone and make her life worse off 
even when she does not so happen to believe or experience it as such, and therefore do not 
have any negative attitudes or emotions towards it.20 This is not to deny that someone’s life 
can be made worse off and is therefore harmed by having such negative mental states. 
                                                          
18 As Boonin argues (n 2, 7-8), pro tanto harms are already sufficient for punishment, even when they are not 
harmful all-things-considered.   
19 Antony Duff & Zachary Hoskins, "Legal Punishment", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/legal-
punishment/>, sec. 1. Some might object to my characterization here. For an already repentant offender who 
embraces and perhaps even seeks her own punishment, the punitive burden is not harmful in one respect but 
on balance beneficial for her. Rather, it is a benefit since it is precisely by undertaking the burden that she pays 
her reparative debt. In response, I think we should insist that the punitive burden does indeed harm the 
offender in the sense described above (how else are we to understand ‘burden’ if not in terms of making one’s 
life harder, i.e. worse off in at least that one respect?). It is just that for the reasons given she does not see it in 
such a way. This gives us another reason for adopting an objective sense of ‘harm’ for the intending harm 
requirement. 
20 An even more extreme position is that one can be harmed and therefore punished even when one is not 
aware of being harmed at all. I am not committed to this extreme position for the purposes of this paper. 
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Rather, it is to deny that one’s life is made worse off and is harmed by something only when 
one has certain negative mental states towards it or, for that matter, having its supposed 
harmful effects on one cancelled by simply having certain positive mental states towards it.  
An implication of understanding harm in such a way is that people can still be 
considered as being punished, even when they themselves do not experience the intended 
harm of the punishment as such or maybe even have a positive attitude towards it. Thus 
whipping a masochist who enjoys being whipped can still be counted as punishment, as long 
as she is objectively harmed by the whipping in the sense that I have described; and arguably 
she is indeed so at least on account of the physical injuries that result from the whipping.21 
The same can also be said for the homeless person who prefers the security of the prison to 
the unpredictability of life on the streets. She is still being harmed by the liberty deprivations 
that result from her imprisonment.22 None of this implies, however, that in cases where they 
are indeed so punished, we should now not impose additional punishments on them. It all 
depends on the justificatory theory of punishment that is under consideration. It is entirely 
conceivable that a justificatory theory may recommend imposing additional punishments 
when, for example, the end(s) that supposedly justify the original punishment is important 
enough, and that the original punishment has failed disastrously in achieving it because the 
punished failed to experience it as harmful. 
Of course, much more needs to be said about my above understanding of ‘harm’. In 
particular, more needs to be said on just what exactly can objectively harm and make one’s 
life worse off regardless of their beliefs and attitudes towards them and how this judgement 
of being made worse off is to be made. Doing this, however, will take us way beyond the 
                                                          
21 And on account of the pain that she experiences if one thinks pain is bad for one’s life even if one has a 
positive attitude towards it.  
22 See also Boonin (n 2) 8-9. 
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purposes of this paper. Given the limited space here, I shall therefore leave it for another 
occasion and only offer the following more general argument for my above understanding of 
‘harm’ when thinking about the nature and definition of punishment. 
Ancient stoics, for example Epictetus, held that the only way in which they can be 
harmed is by becoming less virtuous.23 If people can be harmed only if they so happen to 
experience it as harmful, then someone who so happen to be a firm and sincere stoic cannot 
be harmed, nor by extension punished, as long as they remain virtuous themselves. This, 
however, seems highly implausible. More plausible is the claim that they can indeed be 
harmed and punished even when they remain virtuous themselves. Of course, more likely 
than not their punishment in such cases would be unjustifiable, since they remained virtuous; 
but the plausible thought here is that they are at least unjustifiably punished and harmed had 
they been punished, and not merely that an unsuccessful attempt was made to (unjustifiably) 
punish them. Indeed, even in cases where they are justifiably punished (because they 
committed vices), it seems plausible to think that they have suffered a harm which is in 
addition to and distinct from whatever harms that they may so happen to suffer in virtue of 
them being less virtuous. If all this about harming and punishing committed stoics is true, then 
they suggest adopting something like my above understanding of ‘harm’ and how someone 
can indeed be objectively harmed regardless of their subjective mental states.  
Although the intending harm requirement is widely accepted,24 it is not without its 
dissenters. Thus according to Zaibert, the hard treatment in punishment can simply be 
something that A knows would make B suffer without necessarily having the intention that B 
                                                          
23 Wringe (n 2) 27 fn. 24. 
24 See e.g. Boonin (n 2) 13 fn. 14 and Nathan Hanna, “Liberalism and the General Justifiability of Punishment,” 
Philosophical Studies 145 (3) (2009): 325-349, 330.  
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suffers.25 More recently, Wringe also argues that it is simply a “treatment that would normally 
be found burdensome by a typical individual of the kind on whom it is being imposed”.26 
One difficulty with this debate is that people from both sides do not always use the 
same terms when talking about what I refer to as the intending harm requirement. As a result, 
it is sometimes not clear whether they are talking about the same thing. In particular, while 
those who endorse the requirement – for example Boonin and Hanna – speak primarily in 
terms of ‘harm’ more generally,27 Zaibert and Wringe speak primarily in terms of ‘suffering’ 
when talking about the intention that is allegedly required for punishment.28  
For reasons that I have given above, I think it should be ‘harm’ understood in the way 
that I have described and not simply ‘suffering’ when it comes to the intending harm 
requirement. This is because otherwise we would have to conclude (to use some of the above 
examples) that whipping the masochist who enjoys it cannot count as punishment, and 
neither can the imprisonment of a committed stoic (as long as that does not affect her 
virtuousness). This is because presumably neither of them has any negative emotions towards 
their respective treatments and therefore are not suffering as a result of those treatments. 
The masochist thoroughly enjoys the whipping, while the committed stoic, firmly believing 
that nothing can harm her as long as she remains virtuous, is not bothered by the 
imprisonment at all and therefore has no feelings towards it. If punishment requires that they 
                                                          
25 Leo Zaibert, Punishment and Retribution (Aldershot: Ashgate 2006), 49-58. A list of all the conditions that he 
thinks is necessary for punishment can be found in ibid 31-33. 
26 Wringe (n 2) 26.  
27 Hanna also spoke in terms of ‘suffering’ in his earlier work (e.g. n 13 and n 24 – he claims to be using the 
term as ‘a sort of catchall’ on p 329 of the latter). In contrast, he uses ‘harm’ more specifically in his more 
recent paper “The Nature of Punishment: Reply to Wringe,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (5) (2017): 
969-976. 
28 It is true, as Hanna observes (ibid fn 3), that Wringe does not just speak in terms of ‘suffering’ but also 
‘harm’ and ‘burdensome treatments’. However, I think it is clear from the text that he is primarily thinking in 
terms of ‘suffering’ when talking about the kind of intention that is required for punishment.  
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suffer as opposed to being harmed in the more general sense that I have described, then 
neither of them can be said to be punished in those two cases. 
Very little attention has been given to whether the intention that is required for 
punishment is ‘harm’ more generally or ‘suffering’ more specifically. Rich has recently offered 
an argument in favour of the latter and against the former. According to Rich, what is intended 
in punishment must be ‘suffering’ more specifically because “… if [it is] not to make the 
offender feel the sting of her criminal conviction, it is very hard to see why hard treatment 
would be imposed at all” (Rich makes clear she is talking about motivation rather than 
justification here).29  
I fail to see why the only motivation for punishment is to “make the offender feel the 
sting of her criminal conviction” or (to put it in a non-legal context) make the wrongdoer feel 
the sting of the judgement that she has committed a wrong. It seems possible that one can 
also be motivated to punish an offender simply because one believes she deserves, in virtue 
of her wrongdoing, to have her life made worse off and therefore ‘harmed’ in this more 
general sense independent from how she so happen to experience it.  I admit this might not 
be a good justification for punishing an offender, but it seems to me a perfectly possible and 
intelligible motivation for it. For this reason, I remain unconvinced by Rich’s argument that 
we should reject the intending harm requirement and instead adopt an ‘intending suffering 
requirement’.30 
It is important to distinguish the intending harm requirement from the more specific 
intending suffering requirement. This is because Wringe’s dissent seems to be at least partly 
                                                          
29 Sylvia Rich, “Corporate Criminals and Punishment Theory,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 29 (1) 
(2016): 97-118, 110-111. 
30 Rich offered the argument to show corporations cannot be punished since while they can be harmed more 
generally, they are unable to experience suffering. In rejecting her argument here, I do not find it particularly 
problematic to accept the implication that corporations can also be punished.  
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motivated by the potential implications of the latter and not the former. Thus before he goes 
on to show how his alternative view of hard treatment can still adequately distinguish 
punishment from other non-punitive kinds of hard treatments, Wringe says the following: 
 
“If I inflict on you some treatment which is designed to cause you to suffer, and you do 
not in fact suffer, then I have to that extent failed… But if I intend to inflict on you some 
treatment which would typically cause suffering in individuals like you and you do not 
suffer, then I have not necessarily failed… Perhaps I have failed because, very unusually, 
you have become a convinced Stoic while awaiting sentence, and now believe that 
imprisonment is not a way in which you can be harmed. Or perhaps you have fallen into 
an uncharacteristic state of insensibility. In these cases, I have not necessarily failed in 
the goal of inflicting treatment that someone like you would normally find 
burdensome”.31 
 
This passage suggests that Wringe is eager to allow for the possibility of successful 
punishment even in cases when it fails to cause suffering on those who are punished – the 
firm and sincere stoic and the grieving parent who, for example, is so traumatised by the loss 
of her own children (perhaps as a result of her own wrongdoing) that she feels nothing 
towards anything that might befall on her now. However, as I have argued earlier on, what 
these cases show is that we should instead reject the narrower intending suffering 
requirement in favour of the broader intending harm requirement. This is because it is 
                                                          
31 Wringe (n 2) 26-27. 
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possible to harm the stoic and the grieving parent even when they do not suffer as a result of 
the harmful treatment. 
 Furthermore, as Hanna points out, it is not clear whether Wringe’s alternative to the 
intending harm requirement can rule out cases that we intuitively might not count as 
punishment.32 To recall, Wringe argues that the hard treatment in punishment should simply 
be a “treatment that would normally be found burdensome by a typical individual of the kind 
on whom it is being imposed”.33 However, we can imagine someone who does not want nor 
intend to harm an offender, but in order to quell public anger, decided to reprimand the 
offender in response to her wrongdoing by imposing on her something that would normally 
be found burdensome by a typical individual of her kind, all the while knowing that she is in 
fact rather atypical and will not find it burdensome at all. Hanna’s intuition, which I also share, 
is that this is arguably not a case of punishment, but pretend punishment at the very most. If 
that is true, then this suggests that Wringe’s alternative is inadequate and what is needed is 
the intending harm requirement instead.34  
Zaibert’s argument, on the other hand, applies to both the intending suffering 
requirement and the intending harm requirement since it targets more specifically the 
‘intention’ part of the requirements. Zaibert thinks that we should include in punishment not 
just the harms that were intended but also those that were known. In support of this, he asks 
us to imagine a parent who punishes her son by having him grounded in his bedroom in 
response to his wrongdoing. However, the parent also knows that her son’s bedroom is 
                                                          
32 Hanna (n 27) 970-971. 
33 Wringe (n 2) 26. 
34 This example is based on the one offered by Hanna but modified to take into account the other conditions 
that Wringe thinks are essential to punishment. Like me, Wringe also accepts the response requirement that I 
shall discuss in the next section, but unlike me he is open to the possibility that the expressive function is 
indeed essential to punishment.  
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infested with poisonous snakes even though she does not wish nor intend her son to be bitten 
by them. If her son is indeed bitten by them, Zaibert claims, this harm should be seen as part 
of the punishment that is inflicted on the child by his parent. Indeed, Zaibert goes on to modify 
this example further, and argues that even the harms that were simply foreseen by the parent 
and hence recklessly imposed on the child should also count as part of the punishment in 
question.35 
It is unclear why one should follow Zaibert here, unless one already shares his intuition 
about the two cases. What seems to be motivating Zaibert here are worries about the further 
harms that can foreseeably (often with virtual certainty) be inflicted on prison inmates as a 
result of a badly managed and underfunded prison system.36 I share his worry, but excluding 
such foreseeable harms from being part of the punishment in question does not make them 
immune from criticism or any less objectionable. Even if the snake bites do not form part of 
the punishment, we can still criticise the above parent for punishing her child by sending him 
to his bedroom despite knowing that her child will be harmed much more seriously than she 
intends and is warranted as punishment. Similarly, it is wrong to punish people by sending 
them to badly managed and underfunded prisons when we know this will expose them to all 
sorts of personal violence that arguably goes beyond the kind of harm that incarceration is 
meant to impose and is warranted as punishment; and this remains the case whether we 
consider the personal violence as part of the punishment or not. Given that I do not share 
Zaibert’s intuition about his two cases nor see the motivation behind his position, I therefore 
remain unpersuaded. 
                                                          
35 Zaibert (n 25) 49 & 52. 
36 Ibid 57. 
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Before I move on to the next section, let me address two possible counterexamples to 
the intending harm requirement as I have defended it. The first one is (a) where a judge, faced 
with a homeless offender in a bitter winter, sentences her to imprisonment so that she won’t 
freeze to death. The second one is (b) where a judge, who does not want nor intend to harm 
an offender, but in order to quell public anger, sentence a thief to precisely the community 
service that she knows the thief (for some reason) enjoys doing and was planning to do 
anyway. One might think these are cases of successful punishment despite that the offender 
is not harmed in both cases.37 
It is important to note what is required for punishment is simply that an offender is 
harmed in one respect or another, not that her life is made worse off on the whole or all 
things considered.38 Since being locked up and deprived of one’s freedom and liberties does, 
I tend to think, makes one’s life worse off in one respect even when it makes one’s life better 
off all things considered, (a) is therefore not a case of ‘harmless punishment’ that can pose a 
problem for the intending harm requirement.39  
I agree that the offender is not even harmed in this minimal sense in (b); but I also 
tend to agree with Hanna here that the offender is not really punished in such a case.40 Here 
I want to distinguish between being punished and simply being subjected to something that 
the law recognizes as punishment, and maintain that (b) is a case of the latter but not the 
former. However, similar to what I have discussed earlier, none of this implies that the 
offender in question should (or should not) be subjected to further punishments. It all 
                                                          
37 My thanks to a reviewer for highlighting the need to address these two potential counterexamples.   
38 See also n. 18 
39 These two cases also highlight the difficulties with the intending harm requirement for institutional cases of 
punishment, since those who impose punishment on behalf of the institution (e.g. the judges in our criminal 
justice system) can frequently not have the required intention. I shall say more about this at the end of the 
next section.  
40 Hanna (n 27) 971.  
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depends on the justificatory theory of punishment that is under consideration, i.e. whether it 
is justifiable to subject the offender to other punishments that would actually harm her 
despite her already being subjected to what the law recognizes as punishment.  As far as this 
paper is concerned, I remain open on this particular normative issue. 
Furthermore, even if the offender is not really punished in (b), it does not imply that 
she cannot have a right to appeal because there is nothing about which she may appeal 
against. This relates to the ‘response requirement’ that I shall discuss in the next section.  
Insofar as an offender is subjected to something that the law recognizes as punishment, then 
even if the sentence itself – the community service – does not actually harm the offender, it 
is nevertheless something that is ostensibly imposed on her in response to her being found 
guilty for committing a wrong.41 Thus even if the offender is actually not harmed by the 
sentence in question, she may still appeal against the fact that she was found guilty and being 
ostensibly sentenced in response to that finding. Thus, accepting that the offender is not 
really punished in (b) does not imply the counterintuitive conclusion that the offender 
therefore has no right to appeal simply because she was not harmed by the sentence in 
question.42  
 
4. Hard Treatment Imposed in Response to Alleged Wrongdoing 
So far I have been focusing on the element of hard treatment in the standard account 
of the nature and definition of punishment; and I have argued that this involves intentionally 
                                                          
41 I say ‘ostensibly’ here and I take that to be sufficient for the immediate purpose. However, as I shall discuss 
at the end of the next section, in institutional cases of punishment such as (b), there are reasons to think that 
sometimes the response requirement can indeed be satisfied (and not just ostensibly so) even when the judge 
who works on behalf of the institution does not take her wrongdoing as a reason for imposing the sentence in 
question. See txt at n 54 through to n 59.  
42 My thanks to a reviewer for raising this objection.  
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harming the person who is being punished. Equally important is that this hard treatment is 
intentionally imposed on an alleged offender in response to her alleged wrongdoing. This is 
because punishment is not mere gratuitous injury or wanton violence. Rather, there is a 
reason (or at least an alleged reason) for the intentional infliction of harms; it is intentionally 
imposed on an individual because she has (or is at least believed to have) committed a wrong. 
Or in other words, what distinguishes punishment from other kinds of intentional infliction of 
harms is that committing a wrong is taken to be a reason for intentionally harming the 
individual in question. I shall refer to this as the “response requirement”.43 
It is important to note that the response requirement does not amount to an implicit 
endorsement of a retributive justificatory theory of punishment. This is because the response 
requirement merely states that committing a wrong is simply taken as a reason for 
intentionally harming the individual question. This is consistent with it actually not being a 
sufficient reason or even a reason for intentionally harming the individual in question. 
One implication of the response requirement is that one cannot be punishing another 
when one sincerely believes that the other has not committed any wrong. This is because one 
cannot be regarded as acting in response to X, or take X as a reason for action, when one 
sincerely believes that X is false (‘X’ here being that the individual in question has committed 
a wrong). The response requirement therefore excludes from punishment what Rawls refers 
to as “telishment”, in which one treats another as having done wrong and ‘punishes’ her for 
it even when one knows that she is has not done any wrong but because doing so will, for 
example, lead to certain good consequences.44 The response requirement, however, does not 
                                                          
43 Boonin (n 2) 17-18. Boonin calls this the “retributive requirement”. I have changed his terminology here 
because of its possible mistaken association with retributive justificatory theories of punishment, as I shall 
explain in the next paragraph. 
44 John Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules,” The Philosophical Review 64 (1955), 3-32, 11. 
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exclude accidental punishments, in which we end up punishing an innocent person despite 
our best efforts to establish the case at hand. It also does not exclude those who we end up 
punishing because they were (unknown to us) framed by others, neither does it exclude those 
who we punish because we were insufficiently attentive when establishing whether she has 
committed a wrong.45 However, because the response requirement does rule out telishment 
as a kind of punishment, one might object to it as constituting a ‘definitional stop’.46 
I don’t think there is anything per se objectionable to define ‘punishment’ in such a 
way that excludes telishment, any more than it is to define ‘square’ in such a way that 
excludes anything with less or more than four sides. What is objectionable, however, is how 
such a definition is sometimes used in debates about the justification of punishment.  
Thus Hart talks about how some consequentialists, when confronted with the 
objection that their justificatory theory would allow the punishment of those who are 
sincerely believed to have not committed any wrongs if it leads to better consequences, 
would simply respond that this is not true since they are merely ‘telished’ and not ‘punished’. 
Hart’s response to this is to include telishment as a sub-standard or non-central case of 
punishment.47 For my part, I would insist that the normative burden is not discharged simply 
because one is ‘telished’ as opposed to being ‘punished’.48 It remains to be shown why it is 
justifiable to telish someone simply when it would be beneficial to do so, i.e. to treat someone 
who one knows has not done any wrong as if she has and ‘punish’ her for it just because this 
would lead to certain good consequences. 
                                                          
45 For a more detailed discussion of these different forms of ‘punishing the innocent’, see Patrick Tomlin, 
“Innocence Lost: A Problem for Punishment as Duty,” Law and Philosophy 36 (2017): 225-254, 229-230. I have 
separated out the case of being insufficient attentive from his case of being indifferent. This is because I fail to 
see how one is acting in response to X when one is utterly indifferent towards whether X is true or not. His 
case of being indifferent is therefore another kind of telishment. 
46 Hart (n 5) 5-6. 
47 Ibid.  
48 See also Zaibert (n 25) 27-28. 
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Instead of defending them, one can also use the ‘definitional stop’ to criticise the 
consequentialists. The thought here is that since such theories seek to justify punishment in 
light of the future consequences that it promotes, what it ends up justifying is not a practice 
of punishment that takes wrongdoing as a reason for harming the alleged wrongdoer (i.e. the 
response requirement), but a totally different practice that takes the promotion of future 
consequences as a reason for harming the alleged wrongdoer – or indeed anyone as it is in 
the case of telishment.49 One might then object to the response requirement as being unfair 
to the consequentialists, as it excludes their justificatory theory of punishment by definitional 
fiat.50 
The mistake here is to think that the response requirement excludes consequentialist 
justificatory theories of punishment when it in fact does not. Rather, it only determines what 
exactly needs to be justified here. Thus what consequentialist justificatory theories of 
punishment need to show is that consequentialist considerations can be sufficient to justify 
taking the supposed fact that someone has committed a wrong as a reason for harming her, 
and therefore intentionally harming her as a response to her alleged wrongdoing. If 
consequentialist justificatory theories succeed in doing this, then so much the better for 
them; but if they fail to do so, then so much the worse for them.  Of course, it is possible that 
consequentialist considerations can also end up justifying things that go beyond or are 
different from punishment, for example telishment and even intentionally harming someone 
with no pretence of wrongdoing on her part simply in order to avert a future disaster. 
However, the question here is not about all these other examples of non-punishment but 
                                                          
49 This seems to be the version of ‘definitional stop’ argument that John Gardner pressed against Hart in his 
Introduction to the 2nd edn, of Punishment and Responsibility (n 5) xxv-xxvi. 
50 See also Boonin (n 2) 20-21. Note that Boonin does not characterize it as a kind of ‘definitional stop’ 
argument.  
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whether consequentialists can successfully justify punishment in the way I have described. Of 
course, such examples can and do call into question the (consequentialist) justificatory 
strategy that underlies consequentialist justificatory theories of punishment, but they do so 
whether they count as punishment or not. Thus, although I agree that the response 
requirement does constitute a ‘definitional stop’ - i.e. that any intentional harms that are not 
imposed in response to alleged wrongdoing in the sense I have described are simply by 
definition not punishments – there is nothing objectionable about it. It neither confers an 
unfair advantage nor an unfair disadvantage to consequentialist justificatory theories of 
punishment.  
Nevertheless, there is an ambiguity with the response requirement as it currently 
stands. An ambiguity that might lead one to conclude that even if we accept the response 
requirement, we are still unable to distinguish punishment from other kinds of intentional 
infliction of harms. Boonin, for example, describes a case in which a prospective gang member 
(call her ‘prospect’) goes through a rite of initiation by being branded with a hot iron, but only 
on the condition that she commits a wrong, like stealing a car. In such a case, it seems that 
the prospect is intentionally harmed precisely because of and in response to the fact that she 
committed the wrong in question. Yet, this clearly is not a case of punishment. Boonin takes 
this to support the inclusion of a censorial/reprobative function in the definition and nature 
of punishment.51 
I believe Boonin is too quick in accepting the alleged inadequacy of the response 
requirement here. It is true that, perhaps from an impartial and objective point of view, the 
prospect has committed a wrong – she has done something that she ought not to have done. 
                                                          
51 Ibid. 22-23. 
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In that sense she is therefore intentionally harmed precisely because and in response to her 
wrongdoing. However, there is another sense in which that is not true; for we can imagine 
that in cases of such kind neither the prospect nor the gang itself and its members really see 
and accept what the prospect has done as something that she really ought not to have done.52 
They might very well use the terminology of ‘wrong’ and ‘ought’ when describing what she 
has done; but they do not see it as something that she has decisive and/or good reasons to 
not do. Rather, they see it as something that she has good reasons to do, or indeed decisive 
reasons to do especially if she wants to join the gang. From this point of view, it is not true 
that the prospect is intentionally harmed because of and in response to her wrongdoing; for 
she has not done something that is seen or accepted as something she ought not to have 
done. 
Rather than showing the inadequacy of the response requirement, Boonin’s example 
shows that there is a need to disambiguate the response requirement. What matters to the 
nature and definition of punishment is not whether, from an impartial and objective point of 
view, those who are intentionally harmed have done something that they ought not to have 
done. Rather, it is whether they have done so in the sense that I have described above, i.e. 
that it is seen or accepted as something they really ought (in that full sense of ‘ought’) not to 
have done.53 It is only when someone is intentionally harmed in response to this is the 
response requirement fulfilled and that the case at hand is an instance of punishment.  
                                                          
52 I shall address cases where this presumption does not hold later in this section. 
53 Another way to understand what I mean here is in terms of what H.L. A. Hart refers to as the “internal points 
of view” and the “internal aspect of rules”; that is, to have a “critical reflective attitude” towards the 
behaviour(s) prescribed by the norm in question (which the wrongdoer has now violated), see it as a standard 
for conduct and this is manifested in “criticism (including self-criticism), demands for conformity and in 
acknowledgements that such criticism and demands are justified…” (The Concept of Law 2nd edn. (New York: 
OUP, 1994), 57 & 89). 
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It is of course possible to stipulate this clarification into an example, though it is much 
harder to imagine that in relation to the kind of initiation ceremonies discussed above. This is 
because we are asked to imagine a case where stealing, for example, is both genuinely seen 
and accepted as something that one ought not to do; but also as something that one should 
nevertheless be rewarded for doing, and be granted with the privilege to join the ranks of the 
organizations in question. A more plausible, and I believe more intelligible, example is one 
where a group of wrongdoers have come together in light of their wrongdoings – say to do 
some good - and have decided to mark themselves out as a group by branding each other 
with a hot iron. However, unlike Boonin’s example, it is now less clear that this is indeed not 
a case of punishment, and that the intentional harms in such cases are not simply (self-
inflicted) punishments. 
So far I have talked in terms of ‘seeing or accepting’ X as a wrong, and ‘taking X as a 
reason for’ imposing the harm in question. This suggests that what matters when it comes to 
whether or not something is an instance of punishment are the mental states of those who 
are inflicting the harm and/or those who are directing it. As long as they see or accept that 
what someone has done is wrong in the sense described above, and take that as a reason for 
imposing the harm in question, then they are punishing her. Thus in my above response to 
Boonin’s example, I have simply assumed that everyone who is  involved – and in particular 
those who are doing the branding and those who are directing it – all share the gangs’ view 
in that what the prospect has done is not a wrong. However, imagine instead that the person 
who is directing it or the person who is inflicting it does not share the gangs’ values. 
Unbeknownst to others, she does see what the prospect has done is something that she 
indeed ought not to be have done, and take that as a reason for branding the prospect. In 
that case it does seem that the prospect is being punished by the person in question, albeit 
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privately since it is unbeknownst to others. One can imagine the outrage that the gang 
members and the prospect would feel had this come to light, and how she would be labelled 
(quite rightly I think) as an ‘opportunistic punisher’. 
However, it is not only in virtue of peoples’ mental states that we may say a conduct 
is seen or accepted as a wrong and is taken as a reason for the imposed harm. Very often we 
speak of institutions as seeing or accepting that it is wrong to engage in certain kinds of 
conducts and taking that as a reason for imposing the harms in question.54 Insofar as that 
holds in the particular case at hand, then what we have is an instance of punishment even 
when those who are working on behalf of the institution does not so happen to have the 
requisite mental states.55 Thus we can imagine a judge who regularly sentences offenders on 
behalf of our criminal justice system but does so without the requisite mental states. This 
might be because she only sees it as a job, or because she does not share the institution’s 
view that the kinds of conducts in question are indeed wrongs but continued on in order to 
keep her job. While we might have questions about the moral integrity of the judge here, I 
contend that in both cases what she is imposing on behalf of the criminal justice system are 
still punishments, as long as the institution in which the judge is working on behalf of does 
indeed see or accept the kinds of conducts in question as wrongs and take that as a reason 
for harming those who engage in them.  
Admittedly, both the intending harm requirement and the response requirement are 
more straightforward in cases of non-institutional punishments than they are in cases of 
                                                          
54 I shall say more about the latter later on; but one reason for thinking that the former holds is when those 
who work on behalf of the institution has what Hart refers to as the “internal point of view” and therefore a 
“critical reflective attitude” towards the behaviour in question. This in turn is manifested through the language 
that they use to describe the behaviour and their readiness to demand others not to engage in the said 
behaviour and criticise those who do. See also n. 53. 
55 None of this means that wrongdoers are therefore punished twice if those who work on behalf of the 
institution in such cases also so happen to have the requisite mental state. The two perspectives are merely 
two different ways in which we can characterize what is being imposed as an instance of punishment. 
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institutional punishments. The latter involves attributing intention and agency to a group of 
actors in a way that is not simply reducible to the intentions and agencies of its individual 
actors. This raises all sorts of thorny questions about the metaphysical status of such 
collective intentions and agency, what is the grounding for them and how they relate to those 
of individual actors even when they are not simply reducible to them. Answering these 
questions, however, require a separate discussion and a paper in its own right.56 
What I instead want to point out for the purposes of this paper is that despite all these 
thorny metaphysical questions, there are nevertheless other reasons for thinking when an 
institutional practice satisfies the intending harm requirement and the response requirement. 
Thus one reason for thinking that an imposition is intended to harm someone is that this is 
the aim or purpose of the imposition in question and that the imposition is normally 
considered to be unsuccessful if that person is not harmed by it.57 Insofar as we have reasons 
to think that this is the case for the kinds of harms that are imposed by the institution in 
question, then leaving aside thorny questions about group agency and intention, there are 
also reasons to think that what we have here are intended harms and is therefore something 
that satisfies the intending harm requirement for punishment.58 
                                                          
56 But see e.g. Christian List & Philip Pettit, Group Agency: The Possibility, Design and Status of Corporate 
Agents (Oxford; New York: OUP 2011); Margaret Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation: Membership, 
Commitment and the Bonds of Society (Oxford; New York: OUP 2006), esp. Part II; and Peter French, Collective 
and Corporate Responsibility (New York: Columbia University Press 1984). For a more particular discussion of 
this in relation to legal punishment, see Wringe (n 2) ch 3.  
57 Note that this does not imply that people will always be punished again whenever their original punishment 
was unsuccessful. As mentioned earlier (txt at n 40), there might be reasons against imposing another 
punishment even when the original one was unsuccessful. Thus one might not be punished again simply for 
these reasons.   
58 Admittedly the name ‘intending harm requirement’ is not the most ideal as it might give undue emphasis on 
the existence of a certain identifiable mental state as being necessary for punishment. Rather, what is 
necessary for punishment is simply that it is aimed at harming the wrongdoer. Thus in one of his latest articles 
Hanna refers to the same requirement as the ‘Aim to Harm Requirement’ instead (n 27). In this paper I have 
simply followed Boonin (n 14) and refer to the requirement with its arguably more conventionally recognized 
name.  
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 The same can also be said for the response requirement. One reason for thinking that 
X is a response to wrongdoing is that it is normally considered to be a mistake to have X-ed, 
if it turns out that there was no wrongdoing in the sense that I have described.59 Insofar as 
there are reasons to think this holds in the institutional cases in question, then just like the 
above with the intended harm requirement, there are also reasons to think that the response 
requirement is also satisfied in those institutional cases. 
 It is also important to distinguish between punishment and telishment in institutional 
cases.60 A case of the latter would be one in which the institution in question does not (for 
one reason or another) actually see or accept X as a wrong - hence it cannot be a case of 
punishment as the response requirement cannot be satisfied – but it nevertheless (for other 
reasons) treats it as a wrong, and those who have X-ed as having committed a wrong and 
ostensibly ‘punish’ them by subjecting them to hard treatment for committing it. Examples of 
such cases of telishment, I think, can be found in criminal offences that are deliberately over-
inclusive, e.g. statutory rape and assisted suicide.  It seems plausible to suggest that at least 
in some of these cases the state does not actually see or accept those who commit such 
offences as necessarily committing a wrong, for example when there is genuine consent in 
the former and when the latter is well-motivated and done in response to a genuine request. 
Nevertheless, it still criminalises all such conducts and prohibits anyone regardless from 
having sex with an underage person and assisting others in their attempts at suicide, provides 
no defence for those who are brought to trial and are found to have committed either of 
them, and basically treat them as if they have indeed committed a wrong and ostensibly 
‘punish’ them by subjecting them to hard treatment for committing the two offences. 
                                                          
59 Wringe (n 2) 31-32. 
60 See txt at n 44 through to n 50. 
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Whether or not it is justifiable for the state to do all this and telish people, however, is a 
separate and open question. As I have pointed out in my earlier discussion, the mere fact that 
one is telished as opposed to being punished does not make it any more justifiable. The same 
also applies to institutional cases of telishment. 
Before I move on to the next section, let me also discuss another possible example 
against the standard account in relation to the response requirement. It seems self-defence 
poses a difficulty here. This is because self-defence typically involves intentionally harming 
someone that is also often done in response to her wrongdoing. This then suggests that the 
expressive function of punishment is needed in addition to the standard account after all.61  
I disagree. There is a distinction between responding to a past or pre-existing wrong 
and responding to a future anticipated wrong, and what punishment involves is the former 
while what self-defence involves is the latter.62 What this shows is that there is possibly 
another ambiguity with the response requirement, and that the response requirement should 
be understood more precisely as only referring to ‘responding to past or pre-existing wrongs’. 
Understood in such a way, the standard account can then distinguish punishment from self-
defence without resorting to the expressive function of punishment. 
Note that this does not mean people cannot be punished for attempting to commit a 
wrong. This is because what the punishment is responding to in such cases is not the future 
                                                          
61 See e.g. ibid 33. 
62 See also Boonin (n 2) 193. More specifically, self-defence involves responding to a future anticipated 
wrong/harm that could have occurred had one not intervened and defended oneself. Thus someone who is 
confident in her ability to defend herself is still responding to a future anticipated wrong/harm in that sense 
when she defends herself. As one reviewer points out, this way of understanding self-defence implies that it is 
not an instance of self-defence when one defends oneself from an attack even when one believes (rightly or 
wrongly) that the attack will be unsuccessful. This is because in such a case one could not be responding to a 
future anticipated wrong/harm. I think this is correct. It is a further question, however, whether in such a case 
one is nevertheless entitled to harm the attacker in order to repel the attack because one’s belief can be 
mistaken and that the attack will actually be successful. I remain open on this further question. My thanks to a 
reviewer for raising these further issues relating to my understanding of self-defence.  
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wrong that the offender is currently attempting to commit, but the current wrong of 
attempting to commit a wrong. What the response requirement does exclude, however, are 
‘pre-punishments’ from being a kind of punishment. These are cases where someone is 
supposedly ‘punished’ for wrongs that they have yet to commit.63 Finally, it is also worth 
mentioning that nothing I have said so far about the difference between self-defence and 
punishment implies that any attempt which seeks to justify punishment based on self-defence 
is necessarily doomed.64 This is because what is at stake with such justificatory theories of 
punishment is not whether punishment is simply a kind of self-defence and is therefore 
justifiable in the same way. Rather, it is whether the same or similar kind of considerations 
that render self-defence justifiable can also render it justifiable to punish, i.e. to intentionally 
harm someone in response to a past or pre-existing wrong that she has committed.  
 
5. Feinberg’s Mere Penalties and Other Examples 
Once it is properly spelled out and understood, the standard account can indeed 
adequately account for the kind of examples that Boonin alleges it cannot. What about 
Feinberg’s mere “penalties”, which includes “parking tickets, offside penalties, sackings, 
flunkings, and disqualifications”? As I have pointed out earlier, it is not clear why all instances 
of the above are not and should not be considered as punishments. Flunkings are not typically 
considered to be punishments; neither should they be so considered, for they are not 
normally harms that are intended and imposed as responses to wrongdoing in the sense that 
                                                          
63 For a vivid illustration of such a regime, see e.g. the 2002 Hollywood film Minority Report. What we have 
here is therefore also another ‘definitional stop’. See txt at n. 46 for a discussion of the worries that one might 
have about such ‘definitional stops’.  
64 Examples of such attempts include e.g. Warren Quinn, “The Right to Threaten and the Right to Punish,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985): 327-373 and more recently Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm (New 
York: OUP 2011).  
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I have discussed. Rather, they normally are only foreseeable harms that are imposed in 
responses to failures in assessments that have nothing to do with wrongdoing (e.g. exams in 
schools). Being disqualified to drive, on the other hand, can be a punishment for driving 
dangerously; but one can also be disqualified to drive by failing (i.e. flunking) a license renewal 
test (if there is one), and that is not nor should it be considered as a punishment. The same 
can also be said for sackings. One can be sacked for committing a wrong at one’s work place, 
but one can also be sacked for failing to live up to the boss’s expectations. What distinguishes 
those disqualifications and sackings that are punishments and those that are not is precisely 
the standard account: if the harms that are imposed are intended and imposed as responses 
to wrongdoing in the sense that I have argued for, then they are and should indeed be 
considered as punishments; otherwise, they are not and should not be considered as 
punishments. 
What about parking tickets and offside penalties? Contra Feinberg, I do think that they 
are punishments, for they are typically intended harms that are imposed in response to what 
are at least seen or accepted as something that the relevant individuals ought not to have 
done. It is just that while the former is a legal punishment for a legal offence, the latter is a 
non-legal punishment for breaking the rules of a game. There is no reason to think that just 
because offside penalties are non-legal punishments for a non-legal offence, it is therefore 
not a kind of punishment. 
One thought that is quite common among criminal lawyers and theorists, which I take 
is related to Feinberg’s mere “penalties” but is nevertheless distinct from it, is that we should 
distinguish between ‘real’ crimes that are subject to (criminal) punishments and ‘quasi-
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crimes’ that are subject to penalties.65 The latter of which typically includes parking tickets 
for parking offences. One way to maintain this distinction is precisely by appealing to the 
expressive function of punishment: penalties for ‘quasi-crimes’ are distinguished from 
punishments for ‘real’ crimes because the hard treatments in the former, unlike those in the 
latter, do not convey a censorial/reprobative message about what the alleged offender has 
allegedly done. Should this distinction be abandoned in light of what I have argued for? 
I do not think so. It all depends on how exactly we are to understand this distinction. 
Although I argue against the expressive function of punishment, I nevertheless accept that 
the hard treatment in punishment (or particular instances of it) can also sometimes be used 
or so happen to be seen as conveying censure/reprobation for wrongdoings. Given that the 
hard treatment in punishment is (as I have argued) intended to harm those who are punished 
and is imposed in response to their alleged wrongdoing, and that censure/reprobation is also 
something that is considered to be supposedly painful and hurtful that is done in response to 
alleged wronging, it is not surprising that the hard treatment in punishment is also sometimes 
seen and/or used as a vehicle for conveying censure/reprobation. What I want to deny is 
simply that it being so seen or so used is either a necessary, an essential or a defining feature 
of punishment. 
Accordingly, a distinction between ‘criminal punishments’ and ‘penalties’ can still be 
maintained by how the hard treatment in the former, unlike that in the latter, so happens to 
be seen or is used to convey a censorial/reprobative message. It is just that this difference 
should now not be taken to imply that the ‘penalties’ for ‘quasi-crimes’ are therefore not 
punishments. To the extent that both ‘criminal punishments’ and ‘penalties’ fulfil the 
                                                          
65 While such a distinction is not formally drawn in English law, comparable kinds of distinctions are drawn in 
German law between Straflaten and Ordnungswidrigkeiten, and in the Model Penal Code between offences as 
crimes and offences as violations (MPC s. 1.04). See also Duff, “How not to Define Punishment” (n 2) 40. 
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conditions set out in the standard account that I have argued for above, then both of them 
should be considered as punishments; it is just that the hard treatments in the former are 
also used or so happen to also be seen as conveying a censorial/reprobative message.66 
Whether there are good reasons to continue on using or seeing them in such a way is, 
however, a separate question. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 I have tried to argue against the expressive function of punishment in this paper by 
undermining the arguments that have been offered in support of it. In particular, I have 
argued that this expressive function is not needed to properly distinguish punishments from 
other kinds of non-punitive hard treatments. Rather, the standard account by itself can 
already do the job adequately, once the intending harm requirement and the response 
requirement in the standard account are properly clarified and understood. Thus contrary to 
the arguments that have so far been offered for the expressive function of punishment, the 
need to distinguish punishment from other kinds of non-punitive hard treatment is not a good 
reason for accepting it. Unless there are other forthcoming arguments (to which I am inclined 
to think there are none), then it seems there are no good reasons to accept the expressive 
function of punishment in addition to the standard account of the nature and definition of 
punishment. 
 I have also discussed how denying the expressive function of punishment is consistent 
with the fact that the hard treatments in punishment (or particular instances of them) can 
sometimes be used or so happen to be seen as conveying a censorial/reprobative message. 
                                                          
66 To the extent that is true, it might be useful to distinguish between ‘criminal punishments’ and ‘penalties’, 
though not in terms that somehow imply that one is punishment and the other is not.  
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Law and Philosophy. The final 
authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10982-019-09353-7. 
Page 32 of 32 
This is not surprising since, as I have explained earlier, censure/reprobation and punitive hard 
treatments are both things that are done in response to alleged wrongdoings and are 
supposedly harmful and/or painful to those who are subject to them (indeed intended to be 
so in the latter cases). I believe this helps to explain why one might be inclined to accept the 
expressive function of punishment. However, doing so would be to mistake contingent 
features of punishment with features that are necessary, essential or definitive of it.  
  
